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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Wilson, the appellant, was found guilty by a jury of the offense
of receiving and concealing stolen goods of a value less than $25. Wilson
was defended by five different lawyers: first by the public defender;
then by a lawyer whom he paid $30 but who withdrew with the con-
sent of the court after a surety had been released; then by an attorney
who acted during the trial; then by the public defender who was again
appointed as his attorney but who did nothing; and finally by his pres-
ent lawyer who was appointed by the court and came into the case
after a motion for a new trial, and who procured a bill of exceptions
containing the evidence and instructions showing the prejudicial er-
rors in the trial, although these were not set forth in the motion for
a new trial. Important evidence obtained without a search warrant
was admitted without objection and without any motion to suppress.
An exhibit containing a label describing the goods as stolen when this
was one of the facts to be proven was not objected to. Appellant was
deprived of the right to have in court his "best witnesses." His attor-
ney acquiesced in a bookkeeper's refusal to comply with the terms of
a subpoena, and even criticized his own client. The judge flagrantly
-invaded the province of the jury by casting doubt upon the credibility
of the appellant without any objection from his attorney. On appeal
it was held, (A) that " . . . in a case involving an appellant's life
or liberty we may not ignore prejudicial errors affecting his consti-
tutional rights when, as here, they are clearly and adequately present-
ed in appellant's brief with supporting bill of exceptions," even though
they were not mentioned in the motion for new trial; and, (B) that
the conviction must be reversed because appellant was (1) denied
the right to counsel contrary, (a) to Art. 1, See. 13 of the Indiana
Constitution, (b) to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and (c) to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment; and (2) denied the right to an impartial tribunal guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Wilson v. State, - Ind. -, 51 N.E. (2d) 848 (1943).
The court should be commended for its refusal to follow narrow
procedural rules when injustice would thereby be done and the errors
depriving the appellant of his constitutional rights were otherwise prop-
erly presented to the court.
The record showed that while the appellant had counsel appointed
to assist him, the representation by counsel was " . . . equivalent to
or worse than no representation . . . . " Was this type of counsel
sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements? The court held it
was not, and that *the appellant was denied his rights under both the
Indiana and the Federal Constitutions, because the guaranty of repre-
sentation by counsel meant adequate and not merely perfunctory rep-
resentation.
The court correctly decided that the constitutional guarantee of
counsel had been violated. Our supreme court has consistently held
that this guarantee requires a court, other than a justice of the peace
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court, not only to appoint an attorney for a person unable to employ
counsel but to appoint adequate counsel.'
If the court intended to say that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution applied to this Indiana case, as it might
be inferred that it did, this would be an erroneous statement, since
the Sixth Amendment, as well as other provisions in th- original fed-
eral bill of rights, applies only to the federal government and not to
the state government.2
However, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does apply to the states and the United States Supreme Court has
extended the due process clause so as to include most of the provisions
of the original federal bill of rights3 and it has extended it to include
the right to counsel,4 but in so doing it has taken the position that
the due process clause does not compel a state to furnish counsel.5
For this reason the court was wrong in saying that thu action of the
trial judge in appointing counsel violated the due prccess clause of
the United States Constitution.
But the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees an impartial tribunal 6 and it might be that in this case,
as the court said, the judge acted so that his tribunal was not im-
partial, even though due process does not guarantee a jury trial (or
at least that he did not give appellant an orderly course of procedure);
and to this extent the court might correctly say that the trial was in
violation of the Constitution of the United States.
LEGISLATION
THE PERRY-DECATUR BOUNDARY DISPUTE
In 1933 the Board of Commissioners of Marion County entered
an order changing the boundary between Perry and Decatur Town-
ships. The effect of this action was to locate valuable property
of the Indianapolis Power & Light Co. within the ]anits of Perry
Township which had formerly been in Decatur Township. In 1943 an
1. State ex rel. White v. Hilgemann, Sudge, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N.E. (2d)
129 (1941); Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217
Ind. 493, 29 N.E.(2d) 405 (1940); Sanchez v. State, 199 Ind. 235,
247, 157 N.E. 1, 5 (1927). In a federal case the United States
Supreme Court has held that the guaranty of counsel in the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution has the same mean-
ing. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1.42). See also
People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
2. Betts v. Brady, Warden, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Barren v. Mayer,
etc. of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Willis, "Constitutional Law"
(1935) 502, 562.
3. Near v. Minnesota etc., 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Willis, "Constitu-
tional Law" (1935) 655.
4. Powell et al. v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Betts v. Brady, Warden, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
6. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
7. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
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